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Harmless Amusement or Sexual Harassment?:
The Reasonableness of the
Reasonable Woman Standard
Slick advertising campaigns are staples of the beverage industry, es-
pecially the beer manufacturers. Breweries are notorious for using at-
tractive, scantily clad women to sell their products to their target con-
sumers: men.
But what effects do the commercials have upon women viewers? One
might venture that women simply tune out the commercials, have no
opinion whatsoever of the commercials' content, or object to the
commercials' depiction of women as mindless sex objects.' In fact,
women's responses to such advertisements appear to run far deeper:
one brewery's ad campaign so offended its female employees that they
took their employer to court.
The suit filed by a group of female Stroh Brewery employees charged
that Stroh's ad campaigns represent an integral component of the
company's hostile and sexually harassing work environment.! The case
is unique because the plaintiffs claim that their employer's advertising
content materially aided in creating the hostile work environment.3
Generally speaking, however, nothing is unique about these women's
grievances. Their complaints exemplify occurrences all too common in
the arena of sexual harassment in the workplace: obscene and sexist
comments; slaps on the rear end; the display of pornographic maga-
zines and pictures (including the advertising materials), and male em-
ployees following them home.4
1. Contra News of the Weird, LA. READER, Dec. 6, 1991, at 58. Models working
for a British tabloid protested outside European Community headquarters in Brussels
because they objected to the proposed E.C. Code on sexual harassment in employ-
ment. Id. The models believed that the code, which bans nude pinup photos in
workplaces, would cost them jobs. Id.
2. See Henry J. Reske, Stroh's Ads Targeted, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1992, at 20.
3. Id.
4. Id. For other cases involving the same or similar behavior as the basis for
hostile work environment sexual harassment cases, see Lipsett v. University of P.R.,
864 F.2d*881 (1st Cir. 1988); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988);
Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986); Arnold v. City of Semi-
nole, Okla., 614 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Okla. 1985); Matter of Discipline of Peters, 428
N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1988); Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 842
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Some might claim the women are overly sensitive to the harmless
antics of their male counterparts; as the saying goes, boys will be boys.
Others would contend that the women are reacting as other women
would, if exposed to the same or similar work environment. Are the
women's reactions reasonable or unreasonable? This question is diffi-
cult to answer. Nonetheless, the debate prompted the Ninth Circuit to
adopt, in Ellison v. Brady,6 the reasonable woman or the reasonable
person of the same sex as the victim standard in hostile work environ-
ment sexual harassment cases." The court employed the new standard
to determine whether a hostile work environment existed in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
I. HISTORY OF HosTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT
UNDER TITLE VII
A. The Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 (the Act).7
The Act's purpose was to abolish discriminatory employment based on
membership in five protected classes: race, color, religion, national ori-
gin and sex." Ironically, opponents of the Act added sex to the list of
protected classes at the last moment. They believed the addition of
"sex" would defeat the bill." However, Congress adopted sex as a pro-
tected class with virtually no discussion or debate.'0 Thus, legislative
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
5. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
6. Id. at 879, 880.81.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1988) [hereinafter Title VII]. Title VII provides in
pertinent part
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify
his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's . . . sex ....
Id.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
9. See 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84, 2718-21 (1964). Representative Smith, who pro-
posed the addition of "sex" to Title VII stated, "I do not think it can do any harm to
this legislation; maybe it can do some good." Id. at 2577. He introduced the amend-
ment with the hope of defeating the entire Title VII package. For a more in-depth
account of the original enforcement and opinions regarding the first federal laws
addressing sex-based discrimination in employment, see Leo Kanowitz, Sex-Based Dis-
crimination in American Law III: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Equal
Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGS LW. 305, 310-13 (1968).
10. 110 CONG. REc. 2582, 2584 (1964). See also CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA
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history fails to adequately discuss the adoption of regarding sex as a
protected class. Not until 1972, with passage of additional amendments
to Title VII, did any meaningful legislative history addressing the intend-
ed scope of sex as a protected class become available."
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), created by
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,- is the regulatory agency responsible for
investigating Title VII violations, as well as promulgating regulatory
guidelines." The EEOC's guidance has been critical because Title VII,
though prohibiting discrimination based on sex, never concretely de-
fined "sex: discrimination."" Thus, the courts give great deference to
the EEOC's Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex6 (Guide-
lines) since the Guidelines interpret Title VIi's establishment of sexual
discrimination as a cause of action. The Guidelines reinforce that sexu-
al harassment is sex discrimination under Title VII.6 Therefore, courts
recognize sexual harassment as an actionable form of sex discrimina-
tion prohibited by Title VI.'7
WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS AcT
238 (1985) (dubbing women "accidental beneficiar[ies]" of Title V1-).
11. "[D]iscrimination against women is no less serious than other prohibited forms
of discrimination, . . . [and) it is to be accorded the same degree of concern given
to any type of similarly unlawful conduct." S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7
(1971).
12. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
13. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1-.11 (1991)
[hereinafter Guidelines].
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, quoted in pertinent part supra note 7.
15. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1991) ("Harassment on the basis of sex is a viola-
tion of Sec. 703 of Title VII.") The Guidelines, "while not controlling upon the courts
by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judg-
ment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." General Elec.
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944)); see also J. Clay Smith Jr., Prologue to the EEOC Guidelines on
Sexual Harassment, 10 CAP. U. L REV. 471 (1981) (explaining the formation of the
guidelines and their application). J. Clay Smith Jr. was the acting chairman of the
EEOC at the time the article was written.
16. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1991). The Guidelines define sexual harassment as
"[u~nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physi-
cal conduct of a sexual nature. .. ." Id.
17. See, e.g., Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976), remanded on
other grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding for
the first time that sexual harassment violates Title VII); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d
934, 943-46 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recognizing for the first time that sexual harassment is
sex discrimination).
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B. Actionable Sexual Harassment: from Quid Pro Quo to Hostile
Work Environment
Historically, courts did not recognize hostile work environment sexu-
al harassment as a viable cause of action under Title VII.' Originally,
quid pro quo sexual harassment was the only actionable form of sexual
harassment under Title VII.' Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs
when an employer makes requests and/or demands for sexual favors
and then conditions continued employment upon acquiescence to those
demands.' With quid pro quo sexual harassment, the victim suffers a
tangible job detriment easily recognizable by the courts: job loss, demo-
tion or wage reduction.2'
Since Meitor Savings Bank v. Vinson,' in which the Supreme
Court finally recognized hostile work environment sexual harassment,
federal and state courts have uniformly recognized hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment as a violation of Title VII Hostile work
18. The Guidelines, however, include hostile work environment in the definition of
sexual harassment. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1991). See generally id, § 1604.11(a)
("[S]uch conduct [having) the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
environment.") The Supreme Court did not acknowledge hostile work environment
sexual harassment until 1986. See Meritor Says. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73
(1986).
19. Professor Catherine MacKinnon first coined the phrase "quid pro quo sexual
harassment" CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 32
(1979). The courts could identify with quid pro quo harassment more readily due to
its similarity to disparate treatment and because it raised barriers to employment.
Texas Dept. Of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (holding that
plaintiff must prove discriminatory reason for employment decision). See also infra
note 35 for discussion of disparate treatment analysis.
For cases involving quid pro quo sexual harassment before Metntor, see High-
lander v. K.F.C Nat'l Management Co., 805 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Flagship
Intl, 793 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1986); Benton v. Kroger Co., 640 F. Supp. 1317 (S.D. Tex
1986); Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ga. 1983).
20. The Guidelines recognize quid pro quo sexual harassment where "submission
to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of'an
individual's employment [or when) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual." 29
C.F.R. §§ 1604.11(a)(1)-(2) (1991).
21. E.g., Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340 (10th Cir. 1986) (involving the demo-
tion of sexually harassed employee for failure to submit to sexual advances).
22. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
23. Id. at 73. The first case to recognize hostile work environment sexual harass-
ment was Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Other federal courts soon
followed suit. See, e.g., Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1986); Katz
v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th
Cir. 1982); see also MACKINNON, supra note 19, at 40 (stating that sexual harassment
1074
[VoL 20: 1071, 1993] Reasonable Woman Standard
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
environment sexual harassment occurs when sexual harassment be-
comes so pervasive that it creates an "intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment. " ' A situation involving a hostile work environ-
ment led to Ellison v. Brady. 5
1. From Racial to Sexual Hostile Work Environment Harassment
Originally, courts recognized hostile environment harassment under
Title VII only in situations involving harassment based upon race,' reli-
gion, or national origin." Courts did not extend hostile work environ-
ment harassment to cover sexual harassment until Bundy v. Jackson'
in 1981. The District of Columbia Circuit Court, analogizing Rogers v.
EEOC,5 which addressed racial discrimination, ruled that sexual ha-
in the workplace constitutes sexual discrimination).
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1991). For cases addressing hostile work environment
sexual harassment prior to Met/tor, see Studstill v. Borg Warner Leasing, 806 F.2d
1005 (llth Cir. 1986); Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1986) (recog-
nizing hoslile work environment for the first time in the 8th Circuit); Loftin-Boggs v.
City of Meridian, Miss., 633 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D. Miss. 1986); Toscano v. Nimmo, 570
F. Supp. 1197 (D. Del. 1983)..
25. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
26. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972), was the first case to hold that a discriminatory work environment violated
Title VII. In Rogers, the plaintiff successfully claimed that her employer's practice of
providing discriminatory service to his Hispanic customers created an offensive work
environment for Hispanic employees. Id. at 238. The Rogers court defined the phrase
"term, conditions or privileges of employment," of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), as "an
expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a
work environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination . . . ." Rogers,
545 F.2d at 238. For other racial hostile environment cases pre-dating Meritor's rec-
ognition of hostile work environment sexual harassment, see also Erebia v. Chrysler
Plastic Prods. Corp., 772 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1985); Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193
(8th Cir. 1981); Calcote v. Texas Educ. Found., 578 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1978);
Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied sub nom. Banta v. U.S., 434 U.S. 819 (1977); and St. Louis v. United States,
434 U.S. 819 (1977).
27. See Torres v. County of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1985); Cariddi v.
Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977) (involving national
origin); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (involving reli-
gion and national origin)
28. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also supra note 17. For a discussion of the
implications of Bundy's holding, abandoning the need for tangible job detriment, see
Terence J. Bouressa, Note, Eliminating the Need to Prove Tangible Economic Job
Loss in Sexual Harassment Claims Brought Under Title VII, 9 PEPP. L REV. 907
(1982).
29. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). For a discus-
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rassment responsible for creating an offensive environment also violates
Title VII.' The court believed that denying recovery would allow "em-
ployers to sexually harass a female employee with impunity by carefully
stopping short of... taking any... tangible actions against her in re-
sponse to her resistance."3 '
The Eleventh Circuit, in Henson v. City of Dundee,' followed
Bundy and extended the hostile work environment cause of action.'
Henson is critical since it recognized that "under certain circumstances
the creation of an offensive or hostile working environment due to sex-
ual harassment can violate Title VII irrespective of whether the plaintiff
suffers tangible job detriment."' Henson modified the traditional Title
VII discrimination analysis of quid pro quo sexual harassmente in
order to confront the basic differences involved in hostile work envi-
ronment discrimination, most notably the lack of job detriment.'
sion of Rogers see supra note 26.
30. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 943-44.
31. Id. at 945. The court noted that unless they extended sexual harassment under
Title VII to include hostile work environment, women would be forced to endure a
"cruel trilemma." Id. at 946. With no recourse, a woman would either have to endure
the harassment, attempt to oppose it (with little hope of success legally or realistical-
ly), making her job even less bearable, or quit her job and attempt to find a new
one, which might expose her to further sexual harassment. Id.
32. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). In Henson, male employees bombarded a female
police dispatcher with crude and obscene language, sexual inquiries, and continual
requests for sexual relations. Id. at 899.
33. Id. at 901.
34., Id.
35. Courts found quid pro quo sexual harassment, as a barrier to equality in
employment, structurally easy to work with because they could compare it to other
forms of discrimination violative of Title VII. Due to quid pro quo's similarity to the
other forms of discrimination under Title VII, courts generally analyze quid quo pro
under the disparate treatment framework established in McDonnell Douglas v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, a prima facie case of disparate treat-
ment requires: 1) membership in a protected class; 2) application for a job for which
the individual is qualified and for which the employer was accepting applications; 3)
a rejection; and 4) the position remains vacant and the employer continues to accept
applications from other similarly qualified individuals. Id. at 802. Thus, in quid pro
quo sexual harassment cases, the courts generally applied the following test: 1)
employee belonged to a protected class; 2) employee was subject to unwelcome
sexual harassment; 3) employee complained of harassment based upon sex; and 4)
employee's reaction to the harassment affected tangible aspects of the employee's
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment Henson, 682 F.2d at
909.
36. In instances of hostile work environment sexual harassment, tangible job detri-
ment is usually lacking. Thus, in proving a claim under hostile work environment, the
plaintiff must show that but for her sex, she would not have been the object of the
harassment Henson, 682 F.2d at 904. See also Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942-43
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971)).
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Courts recognizing hostile work environment as a form of sexual ha-
rassment require five common elements: (1) the employee is a member
of a protected class; (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome sex-
ual harassment; (3) the employee complained of harassment based up-
on sex; (4) the harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering
with the plaintiff's work performance and created an intimidating, hos-
tile, or offensive environment that seriously affected the psychological
well-being of the plaintiff; and (5) respondeat superior liability."
2. The United States Supreme Court's Recognition of Hostile Work
Environment Sexual Harassment
In 1986, the Supreme Court, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,'
recognized hostile work environment sexual harassment for the first
time. In Meritor, the Court stated that not all sexual harassment will
violate Title VII.u The Court set forth that hostile work environment
sexual harassment occurs only when the conduct complained of "has
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work
environment."' For a claim to be actionable, the Court stated, though
not explicitly enough,' that the "conduct must be sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and cre-
ate an abusive working environment."' Furthermore, courts must ex-
37. See Meritor Says. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (first Supreme Court
case recognizing hostile work environment sexual harassment as a violation of Title
VII); see also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3rd Cir. 1990);
Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 633 (6th Cir. 1987); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co.,
805 F.2d 611, 619-20 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
38. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). For a detailed analysis of Meritor and an illustrative discus-
sion of the facts surrounding the case, see Victoria T. Bartels, Comment, Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson" The Supreme Court's Recognition of the Hostile Work Envi-
ronment in Sexual Harassment Claims, 20 AKRON L REv. 575 (1987). For greater
discussion about Met/tor and its Impact, see Marlisa Vinciguerra, Note, The Aftermath
of Meritor: A Search for Standards in the Law of Sexual Harassment, 98 YALE LJ.
1717 (1989); Katherine S. Anderson, Note, Employer Liability under Title VII for
Sexual Harassment After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87 COLUM. L REv. 1258
(1987).
39. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
40. Id. at 65. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1991); supra note 18.
41. See infra text accompanying note 45.
42. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.
1982). Other courts have interpreted the Supreme Court's definition to mean that
isolated incidents that offend the victim may not be severe enough to alter the
1077
amine the alleged hostile work environment under the totality of the
circumstances' to determine whether the questioned behavior is suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment."
To the chagrin of the courts, attorneys, victims, and employers, the
Court did not concretely define the degree of pervasiveness necessary
under a Title VII action.' Due to this lack of specificity, district courts
have not been in accord regarding whose perspective to use when judg-
ing the pervasiveness of the conduct. However, courts have widely rec-
ognized two standards to determine the severity of the offensive con-
duct: (1) the reasonable person,' and (2) the reasonable person and
the particular plaintiff."' In deviating from the norm, EUison has re-
ceived both criticism and praise by advocating the reasonable woman
standard or the "perspective of a victim of the same sex as the plaintiff"
in determining whether the complained of conduct creates a hostile
environment. '
With this background in mind, this Comment proposes that the rea-
sonable woman standard is the appropriate perspective from which to
determine whether a hostile work environment exists in violation of
Title VII. In demonstrating that the reasonable woman's perspective is
the preferable standard to view sexually harassing behavior, this Com-
ment chronicles the case law which inspired the Ninth Circuit to adopt
the reasonable woman standard in Part II. Part III focuses upon Eli.son
and illustrates why the reasonable woman standard is the appropriate
standard in hostile work environment sexual harassment cases. Part IV
workplace to such a degree as to violate Title V11. Henson, 682 F.2d at 902 (borrow-
ing from Rogers V. EEOC, 454 F.2d at 238).
43. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1991). In determining
whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the EEOC will look at the
record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the
sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred. Id. The
court will determine the legality of a particular action from the facts and on a case
by case basis. Id.
Since the court must analyze the totality of the circumstances, the Court in
Met/tor asserted that it could consider testimony about the plaintiffs dress and
personal fantasies in determining whether the conduct complained of was actually
unwelcome. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68-69. The Court did stress that the district court
should carefully consider the ramifications of this type of evidence, while acknowl-
edging that no per se rule existed against its admissibility. Id. at 69.
44. Id. at 67-69.
45. Id. at 67.
46. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
47. Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 1989); accord King v.
Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990); see also
inifra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
48. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991).
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highlights the recent adoptions of the reasonable woman standard since
Ellison. Part V discusses the implications of the reasonable woman
standard upon employers.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE REASONABLE WOMAN STANDARD
A. From Law Review Article to "Law"
Commentators generally credit Judge Damon Keith's biting dissent in
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.* as the origin of the reasonable wom-
an standard.' However, the majority declared that in order to provide
adequate protection to plaintiffs and defendants alike, when considering
the totality of the circumstances, the trier of fact "must adopt the per-
spective of a reasonable person's reaction to a similar environment un-
der essentially... similar circumstances."5 Furthermore, the majority
would not consider whether the victim had been seriously affected by
the complained of behavior unless the aforementioned reasonable
employee's work performance and psychological well-being were seri-
ously affected." To understand Judge Keith's rationale advocating the
use of a reasonable woman standard, one must look at the facts of
Rabidue and review the comments of the majority regarding sexual ha-
rassment.
Vivienne Rabidue brought a sexual harassment claim against her su-
pervisor, Douglas Henry.' The findings of fact indicated that Henry
49. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
50. In actuality, Judge Keith borrowed the idea from a law review article. See
Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97
HARv. L REv. 1449, 1451 (1984). Judge Keith borrowed extensively from the author's
reasoning to support his view that "the reasonable person perspective fails to account
for the wide divergence between most women's views of appropriate sexual conduct
and those of men." Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting).
51. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 615. Henry, in fact, exercised no supervisory control over Rabidue, but
Rabidue's job required her to work with him. Id. Also, management knew about
Henry's vulgar propensities and failed to take any corrective action. Id. Osceola Re-
fining Company's Vice President, Charles Muetzel, tried to justify the lack of repri-
mand because "Osceola needed Henry's computer expertise." Id. at 624 (Keith, J.,
dissenting). At a later date, in response to more complaints, another supervisor
merely gave Henry some "fatherly advice" if he had hopes of becoming an executive.
Id. The plaintiff, as well as other women at the facility, also were offended by the
behavior of' their male coworkers. Id. at 615; see also ivqfra note 53 and accompany-
ing text.
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was an extremely vulgar man who made explicit comments about
Rabidue and about women generally.M Referring to Rabidue, Henry re-
marked, 'All that bitch needs is a good lay," and called her a "fat
ass.'M Also, other male employees displayed pictures of nude women
in their offices and in the common work areas,' which Rabidue and
other female employees could see. 7 The majority proclaimed that
while Henry's obscenities were annoying, they were not so outrageous
so as to have seriously affected the "psyches of the plaintiff or other fe-
male employees."' Furthermore, the court stated that the sexually ori-
ented posters only had a de minimis' effect on Rabidue's work envi-
ronment when viewed in light of a society that sexually exploits women
in film, television, radio, and other public places.'
Judge Keith stressed in his dissent that adoption of the reasonable
woman standard would recognize the "wide divergence between most
women's views of appropriate sexual conduct and those of men.""' The
54. The general derogatory comments Henry made about women included terms
such as whores, cunts, and pussies. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 615 (citing Rabidue v.
Osceola, 584 F. Supp. 419, 423 (E.D. Mich. 1984)).
55. Id.
56. The plaintiff and other female employees were exposed daily to sexually ex-
plicit posters and sexual innuendo in the common work areas. One such poster, on
the wall for eight years, showed a naked woman lying supine with a golf ball be-
tween her breasts and a man standing over her, golf club poised, yelling "Fore!" Id
at 624 (Keith, J., dissenting).
57. The plaintiff, as the sole female in management, was the only one to formally
file any complaints, though the other women in the workplace were offended by the
conduct of Henry and other male employees. She was the sole complainant because
the other women feared losing their jobs. Id.
58. Id. at 622. The court proceeded to contend that the incidents of harassment
were not sufficiently compelling to justify finding a violation of Title VII. See id. at
622 n.7.
Furthermore, the majority believed Rabidue assumed the risk of working in a
hostile environment. Id. at 626 (Keith, J. dissenting). The majority reasoned that
because the plaintiff voluntarily entered the workplace she should have reasonably
expected to endure offensive remarks. l at 620. This was especially pertinent,
deemed the majority, since the obscenity permeated the workplace before, during,
and after the plaintiff's employment. Id.
59. Id. at 622.
60. Id Judge Keith would not agree with the majority's rationalization about the
perception of women in society. Id, at 627 (Keith, J., dissenting). If society condones
the exploitation of women in the media, Judge Keith asserted, then "'society' in this
scenario must primarily refer to the unenlightened .... " Id. (Keith, J., dissenting).
Thus, Keith aptly stated, "[Tlhe relevant inquiry at hand is what the reasonable wom-
an would find offensive, not society, which at one point also condoned slavery." Id.
(Keith, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting); see supra note 51 and accompanying text. For
a more detailed look at the differing perspectives of men and women, see infra text
accompanying notes 138-39, 152-59, 163.
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reasonable woman standard, he stated, allows courts to consider the
"salient sociological differences"6 between the genders, while still pro-
tecting employers from the "neurotic complainant.' Furthermore, as
Judge Keith emphasized, unless courts employ the viewpoint of the rea-
sonable woman, defendants and courts will continue to perpetuate en-
trenched notions of acceptable behavior defined by the offenders-in
most cases, men."
B. A Different Application of the Reasonable Woman Standard:
Constructive Discharge
The next case adopting the reasonable woman standard, Yates v.
Avco Corp.,' did so in the context of a constructive discharge cause of
action, involving sexual harassment by a supervisor.' In Yates, two fe-
male employees endured unwelcome and lewd advances by their super-
visor, Sanders."7 Sanders commented on their appearances,
propositioned them, talked of putting them on his mistress list, made
sexual grunts and groans, and described sexual fantasies he had about
them.' One of the women, Mathis, had to be hospitalized due to
62. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting); see infra notes 157-59, 164 and
accompanying text; Part II(C)(2)(c) infra; see also Note, supra note 50, at 1459.
63. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J. dissenting) (citing Note, supra note 49, at
1459).
64. Id. The majority further epitomized the erroneous notion that the complained
of behavior was acceptable and not violative of Title VII. Id. The majority agreed
that
"(indeeci, it cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environments,
humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar. Sexual jokes, sexual conver-
sations and girlie magazines may abound. Title VII was not meant to--or
can-change this. It must never be forgotten that Title VII is the federal
court mainstay in the struggle for equal employment opportunity for the fe-
male workers .... But [it] is quite different to claim that Title VII was
designed to bring about a magical transformation in the social mores of
American workers."
Id. at 620 (quoting Rabidue, 548 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984)). Archaic com-
ments such as the above further illustrate the appropriateness of the reasonable wom-
an/victim standard. See also infra text accompanying notes 139-40.
65. 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987).
66. Id. at 637. To establish a finding of constructive discharge, the court must de-
termine if the "working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a
reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign." Id.
at 636-37 (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 632-33.
68. Id. at 632. When the women rejected Sanders, he made their jobs even more
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Sanders' behavior. ' The harassment not only tormented the women,
but it also created tension among other members of the staff who felt
the plaintiffs were receiving special attention from the boss.'
Managers spoke to both women and asked them not to contact the
EEOC.1 As a further demonstration of an unbearable situation, Avco
would not correct the plaintiffs' personnel files regarding sick leave'
or give them transcripts of the tape recorded statements they had made
during the company's investigation."
The issue on appeal was whether Avco had constructively discharged
Street.' The court utilized the reasonable woman standard in this de-
termination.' Relying upon Judge Keith's dissent, 6 the court an-
nounced that
[ijn a sexual harassment case involving a male supervisor's harassment of...
female subordinatefs], it seems only reasonable that the person standing in the
shoes of the employee should be "the reasonable woman" since the plaintiff in
this type of case is required to be a member of a protected class and is by defini-
tion female."
difficult by becoming angry and spiteful. Id.
69. Mathis began working for Sanders in 1982. By June of 1983, the harassment
affected her so detrimentally that she began to experience fits of shaking and crying.
She was hospitalized in June and once again in July of the same summer. Id. The
other plaintiff involved, Street, began working for Sanders in 1983, when Mathis was
on sick leave. Id.
70. Id. For other examples of the detrimental effects of sexual harassment in the
workplace, see infra note 163.
71. Id. at 633. Avco promised the women that if they did not report the harass-
ment to the EEOC, Avco would represent them fully in eradicating the harassment.
As a result of Avco's internal investigation, Sanders was found "guilty," demoted, and
sanctioned with a cut in salary. ld.
72. The women merely wanted the files to reflect that the unbearable workplace
environment caused their absences. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 633-34, 636-37. The issue on appeal regarding Mathis was whether she
had been retaliated against for her actions against Sanders. Id. at 634, 637-38.
75. Id. at 637. In order to find constructive discharge, the court's inquiry must
focus upon the objective feelings of the employee, as well as the employer's intent.
Yates, 819 F.2d at 636; see also supra text accompanying note 66.
76. See supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
77. Yates, 819 F.2d at 637 (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626
(6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987)). On appeal,
the court determined that no constructive discharge of Street occurred. Id.
The controversial event resulting in Street's resignation occurred on January 5,
when she came to work after calling in sick. Sanders, though relocated out of
Street's department, was cleaning out a desk of a recently deceased co-worker of
Street's. When Street came unexpectedly to the office she saw Sanders, asked him
why he was there, and he replied he had been reassigned there permanently. With
that, Street stormed out, did not contact any Avco officials for an explanation, and
refused to listen to the apology of an Avco official. She resigned on January 9. Id.
1082
[VoL 20: 1071, 1993] Reasonable Woman Standard
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Yates is significant not only for adopting the reasonable woman stan-
dard, but also for broadening its meaning. Though Judge Keith consid-
ered relevant the sociological and societal differences between men and
women,' he never addressed the standard a court should use in the
case of a male victim.' One might assume Judge Keith would apply a
reasonable man standard in that situation. Yates addressed that situation.
The Yates majority set forth that "were this a sexual harassment case
involving a male subordinate, the reasonable man standard should be
applied."' Following the reasoning of Judge Keith's dissenting opinion
in Rabidue, the majority recognized that men and women are "vulnerable
in different ways and offended by different behavior."s" By interpreting
the standard to apply to the sex of the victim involved, Yates further
paved the way for the holding and rationale of Ellison.
C. Hybrid Tests: Midway to Reasonableness
1. Reasonable Person and the Particular Plaintiff
Prior to the Ninth Circuit's express adoption of the reasonable woman
standard in hostile work environment cases, other courts had implement-
ed a dual standard: looking at the harassment from the viewpoint of a
reasonable person and from the particular plaintiff.' This standard, for-
warded by the Seventh Circuit in Brooms v. Regal Tube Co.,' though
similar to Rabidue, differs in a crucial way." In Rabidue, the majority
Applying the reasonable women standard, the court determined Street was not rea-
sonable since she did not seek any outside explanation and refused to listen to the
Avco official. Id, Thus, the court found no constructive discharge. Id.
78. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
79. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 623-28 (Keith, J., dissenting).
80. Yates, 819 F.2d at 637 n.2.
81. Id,; see also infra notes 138-39, 157-69 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 82-84.
83. 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989). Brooms relied upon an earlier decision in the 7th
Circuit, Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986), which called for
the courts to consider whether "the demeaning conduct and sexual stereotyping
cause[d] such anxiety and debilitation to the plaintiff that working conditions were
'poisoned' within the meaning of Title VII." Scott, 798 F.2d at 213. Scott, however,
never discussed from which perspective, either objective or subjective, the court
should view the hostile environment. In Brooms, the court realized that the Scott
holding implied that it should 'consider both the objective and subjective tests.
Brooms, 881 F.2d at 418.
84. Relying upon Scott and Rabidue, the Brooms court determined that the dual
objective/subjective standard is the correct standard to employ when dealing with a
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treated the victim with disdain.' Rabidue emphasized that the conduct,
under similar circumstances, would have to interfere with the hypo-
thetical reasonable person's work performance and significantly disturb
the psychological well-being of that reasonable person.' If the plaintiff
could not meet that standard, then she could not successfully assert
charges of hostile work environment sexual harassment, regardless of
whether that plaintiff was seriously affected by the conduct.'
The Brooms dual standard, adopting in part the reasonable person
perspective,"' is more victim-oriented. In Brooms, the effect on the vic-
tim does not receive secondary treatment. The court will consider the
particular plaintiff's subjective response to the harassment in tandem
with the viewpoint of the reasonable victim.' Thus, under this dual
standard, the court determines whether the conduct was sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the victim's working environment from two
perspectives: (1) whether the conduct adversely affected this particular
plaintiff; and (2) whether the conduct would adversely affect a reason-
able person.'
Title VII sexual harassment claim. Id, at 419. Unlike Rabidue, see supra notes 49-51,
the Brooms court did not require that the objective reasonable person determination
be made before the subjective plaintiffs responses could be considered. Id.
85. See supra notes 54-80, 65.
86. See supra note 51 and accompanying text
87. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
88. Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 1989); see infra text
accompanying note 90.
89. Id. at 418-19. Regal Tube Company hired Helen Brooms as an industrial nurse.
During Brooms' 16-month employment, Charles Gustafson, the Human Resource Man-
ager and Brooms' supervisor, harassed Brooms with racial slurs and sexual innuendo,
usually at the office or at office related activities. Brooms rejected Gustafson's ad-
vances and also notified the proper internal authorities. Id. at 416. One of
Gustafson's most egregious acts occurred when he showed Brooms a pornographic
picture of a white man and black woman engaged in sodomy. Gustafson said that the
picture illustrated the talents of black women, and told Brooms she had been hired
for just that purpose. Id. at 417.
The Brooms court concluded that the sexual harassment Helen Brooms encoun-
tered could have interfered with a "reasonable individual's work performance and
would have affected seriously the psychological well-being of a reasonable employee."
Id. at 420 (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987)). In addition, the court concluded that although the
district court did not explicitly address how a reasonable person would have reacted
to the conduct, they did sufficiently determine the objective portion of the test.
Therefore, even though the district court did not conduct the inquiry adopted by the
appellate court, the appellate court stated that an objective inquiry may have been
"implicit in the district court's holding although never explicitly stated." Id. at 419.
90. In adopting this dual standard, the Brooms court asserted that a district court,
when evaluating a Title VII claim, must focus upon the "likely effect of a defendant's
conduct upon a reasonable person's ability to perform his or her work and upon his
or her well-being, as well as the actual effect upon the particular plaintiff bringing
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2. Particular Plaintiff and a Reasonable Person of the Same Sex as
the Plaintiff
In response to Rabidue,9' the Third Circuit, in Andrews v. City of Phil-
adelphia," utilized a test even more victim-oriented than the Brooms
test.' Under this test, the basic five elements necessary to establish a
prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual harassment are
required." However, Andrews varies these elements," thereby making
the determination more empathetic to the victim. Hence, under Andrews,
bringing a successful hostile work environment claim requires that the
discrimination detrimentally affect the plaintiff while also detrimentally
affecting a reasonable person of the same sex in that position."
The court distinctly noted that both the objective and subjective
prongs of the test are critical in determining whether a hostile work
environment existed in violation of Title VII. Emphasizing the purpose
of Title VII, the court stressed that Congress intended Title VII to remove
the "'artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when
the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial,
[sexual] or other impermissible classification[s]."' In Andrews, the
the claim." kI (emphasis added). The court must answer both parts of the test in
the affirmative before they can find that a Title VII violation occurred. Id.
Furthermore, the finding of a hostile work environment is a question of law. Id
at 420. Since the district court determined the facts, the Brooms court, as the review-
ing court, had to consider that question of law de novo. Utilizing the dual standard,
the court had no problem upholding the district court's finding that Gustafson's
conduct violated Title VII. Id.
91. See supra notes 49-64 and accompanying text.
92. 895 F.2d 1469 (3rd Cir. 1990). As is customary, the Andrews court employed a
five-part test Id.
93. Id. at 1482.
94. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
95. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482.
96. Id. (emphasis added). For a recent case relying upon EUison to adopt the
Andrews two-part test, see Smolsky v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 780 F. Supp. 283, 294
(E.D. Pa. 1991).
97. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1483. The court emphasized its adoption of the subjective
and objective standard. Id, The court propounded that the subjective component is
necessary since it establishes that the plaintiff was in fact injured by the complained
of behavior. Id. The court expressed that the objective factor, as modified from
Rabidue, was more crucial. The court stated that "it is here that the finder of fact
must determine whether the work environment is sexually hostile." Id.
98. Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
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court had no difficulty determining that the harassment had a detrimen-
tal effect upon the plaintiff.'
The Andrews court had a much more difficult time determining wheth-
er the objective component, that of a reasonable person of the same sex
as the victim, had been met." The court needed to determine objective-
ly whether sexual innuendo pervaded the workplace.'' In overturning
the district court's decision that the environment was not sexually hos-
tile,' the Third Circuit disapproved of the district court's overly restric-
99. In Andrews, Priscilla Andrews and Debra Conn, employed by the City of
Philadelphia Police Department, were victims of sexual harassment by their supervi-
sors and co-workers. Id. at 1471. In addition to filing a Title VII action, the women
also filed a section 1983 action against the city and individual officers. Harassment
experienced by Andrews included destruction of her work, obscene phone calls at
home, and vandalism to her car and other personal property. Id. at 1473-74. The
most severe incident occurred when someone put a lime substance inside a shirt she
kept in a locker in the women's locker room. Id, at 1474.
Conn had a similar experience. She was subjected to numerous sexual propo-
sitions, had sexual devices and magazines placed around her work area, found her
work missing, and experienced vandalism. Id. at 1474-75.
Both women reported the incidents to superiors. Though an investigation was
conducted, the final results stated that no harassment or discrimination had occurred.
Id. at 1476.
At the district court level, the jury awarded both women damages for their
section 1983 causes of action against the city and some of the supervisors. Id. 'Sec-
tion 1983 and Title VII claims are complex actions with different elements. Proof of
some of these elements, particularly discrimination based upon sex and subjective
harm is identical, and thus the court should be bound by the jury's determination of
these issues." Id. at 1483 n.4. The objective portion of Title VII does not apply to
section 1983 actions, thus it was necessary for the Andrews court to determine that
component, Id.
Section 1983 is a viable remedy for hostile work environment sexual harassment,
as an alternative to or in conjunction with Title VII. To bring a section 1983 action
for denial of equal protection, a plaintiff must prove purposeful or intentional dis-
crimination. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986). To prove discrimination
based upon sex, a plaintiff must show that any disparate treatment occurred because
of his or her sex. Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1186-87 (7th Cir.
1986); see also King v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 898 F.2d 533 (7th Cir.
1990); Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir. 1990); Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d
1422 (7th Cir. 1988) (recognizing hostile work environment as actionable under sec-
tion 1983 as a denial of equal protection upon a showing of discriminatory intent
because of plaintiffs sex).
100. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1484 (emphasis added). It was necessary for the court to
determine the objective portion since the district court only needed to find discrimi-
nation for the section 1983 action. See supra text accompanying note 96. Therefore
the Andrews court had to make the factual findings as to this matter. Andrews, 895
F.2d at 1484-85.
101. Id. at 1484.
102. Andrews, 898 F.2d at 1484-86. The Andrew's court also discussed what action
is sufficient to create a hostile work environment. The court declared that the district
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tive interpretation of a hostile environment."° The Andrews court criti-
cized the lower court for examining the incidents of harassment singu-
larly.'" This type of analysis falls short of the totality of the circumstanc-
es analysis required."n In its remand, the court declared that a plaintiff
could satisfy the test's objective prong-the reasonable person of the
same sex as the victim-if all the incidents in sum would result in a hos-
tile working environment "offensive to women of reasonable sen-
sibilities. " "
Unlike Elison, the Andrews court did not explicitly define the reason-
able person of the same sex as the victim as a reasonable woman or man
per se.' 7 However, a close examination of the court's reasoning shows
that the court did have in mind the woman or man, as victim and plain-
tiff, as well as the protection of the employer from frivolous claims.'"
court's denial of hostile work environment sexual harassment on the sole basis that
the behavior lacked sexual advances and contact was unfounded. Id. at 1485. Overt
sexual harassment is not the only behavior that will give rise to actionable hostile
work environment harassment. Id. As the Court said in Met/tor, "Title VII affords
employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule and insult." Meritor Savs. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
Furthermore, Andrews held that pornographic pictures in the work area, as well
as derogatory and obscene language about women constitute sufficient evidence to
show the creation of a hostile work environment. Andrews, 898 F.2d at 1485. There-
fore, the absence of overt sexual behavior in and of itself would not defeat a claim
of sexual harassment, if the aforementioned evidence was apparent. Id.
103. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
104. Borrowing from the Eleventh Circuit, the court stated that the factfinder should
not look at each incident in and of itself. A legitimate reason may exist for each
incident, but taken as a pattern of harassing incidents, the explanations may appear
pretextual. Andrews, 898 F.2d at 1484 (expounding upon Vance v. Southern Bell Tel.
& Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989)).
105. To illustrate a proper totality of the circumstances analysis, the court
analogized the workplace to a play. Id. The court remarked that a play cannot be
understood based on observations of some scenes; a play can only be comprehended
based on its entirety. Id. Therefore, an examination of discrimination must concen-
trate on the entire drama and not particular incidents. Id.
106. Id. at 1486.
107. See supra text accompanying note 96.
108. Andrews, 898 F.2d at 1483. The court offered that the objective standard, in
conjunction with the subjective standard, protects employers and the victimized
employees. lId The objective standard shields the employer from the baseless claims
of a neurotic and reactionary employee while simultaneously protecting the victim
and the goals of Title VII. Id. The objective plaintiff of same sex as the victim stan-
dard, "remov[es] the walls of discrimination that deprive women [and men] of
self-respecting employment." Id.
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These rationales also serve as a basis for the holding of Ellison."
III. ELLISON V. BRADY: THE REASONABLE WOMAN DEFINED
A. Ellison: First to Unequivocally Adopt the Reasonable Woman Stan-
dard
The Ninth Circuit, in Ellison v. Brady,"' was the first court to hold
affirmatively that a female plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile
environment sexual harassment "when she alleges conduct which a rea-
sonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment.""' To appease critics who would claim that women receive spe-
cial treatment, it is essential to note that like Yates,"' Ellison did not
focus solely upon women as victims."' The court pointed out that the
"reasonable woman standard does not establish a higher level of protec-.
tion for women than men.""' In fact, the court recognized that when
male employees endure harassing conduct that creates a hostile environ-
ment, the court must consider the evidence from the perspective of a
reasonable man."" Since the reasonable woman standard recognizes
rather than belittles the consequences of sexual harassment, it enables
courts to protect men and women from a spectrum of sexual abuse in
the workplace."'
B. Kerry Ellison and Sterling Gray
Kerry Ellison worked with her harasser, Sterling Gray, at the San
Mateo office of the Internal Revenue Service."" Ellison's and Gray's
desks were approximately twenty feet from each other. They had worked
109. See inqfra text accompanying notes 140-56.
110. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). Justice Beezer, writing the opinion for the court,
was joined by Justice Kozinski, while Judge Stephens, sitting by designation, dissent-
ed. Id. at 884-85.
111. Id. at 879.
112. See supra notes 66-81 and accompanying text.
113. EUison, 924 F.2d at 879.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 879 n.11.
116. Id. at 879-80 (citing Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d, 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
The court emphasized that a standard recognizing gender differences would help to
equalize women's participation in the workplace with men. Id. at 879. For a more in-
depth explanation of the court's reasons for adopting the reasonable woman standard,
see infra text accompanying notes 140-69.
117. Id, at 873. In 1984, Ellison and Gray participated in the same training class
and upon completion were both assigned to the San Mateo office. Id. Although they
knew each other from the outset, they never became friends. Id
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together for two years before any incidents of harassment occurred.""
Gray first expressed an interest in Ellison when he asked her to
lunch." '9 After that first lunch, Ellison asserted that Gray began'to hang
around her desk, pester her, and repeatedly ask her out for dates." In
October, four months after the first lunch, Gray handed Ellison a note he
wrote for her that stated in part: "I cried over you last night .... I have
never been in such constant term oilf [sic] ... I could not stand to feel
your hatred for another day."'2 Ellison became frightened and left the
room. Gray followed her. At this time, Ellis informed her supervisor
about the note but stated she wanted to handle the situation on her
own. 12
The following week, Ellison left town for training. While away, Gray
sent her another letter which Ellison described as "twenty times, a hun-
dred times weirder" than the first. 2 4 In pertinent part, Gray wrote:
I know you are worth knowing with or without sex .... I have enjoyed you so
much over these past few months. Watching you. Experiencing you from 0 [sic]
so far away. Admiring your style and elan .... Don't you think it odd that two
people who have never even talked together, alone, are striking off such intense
sparks .... 15
Ellison became very frightened and upset. She asked her supervisor
118. Id,
119. It was customary at the office for small groups of people to dine together at
the noon hour. Id, This lunch date occurred in June of 1986. Id On that day, since
no one else was in the office, Ellison accepted Gray's invitation. Id. During the
lunch, Gray took Ellison by his house, claiming he had left his son's lunch there, and
gave her a tour of his house. Id,
120. Id. Gray also asked Ellison out for an after work drink. Id. To decline politely,
she suggested they have lunch again the following week. Id. Not wanting to go,
Ellison purposefully kept herself away from the office at noon. Id. The following
week, Gray uncharacteristically dressed in a three-piece suit and asked Ellison out to
lunch again. Id. at 873-74. She declined. Id,
121. Id. at 874.
122. Id. In the hallway, Gray demanded that Ellison talk to him. Ellison immediately
left the building. Id.
123. Bonnie Miller supervised both Ellison and Gray. Id. Upon reading the note,
Miller declared, "This is sexual harassment." Id. Ellison enlisted the aid of a male
co-worker to inform Gray that Ellison was not interested and to leave her alone. Id.
124. Id.
125. Ld. Gray did mention in the letter that his feelings for Ellison were such that
if she wanted him to leave her alone he would. Id. at 874 n.l. However, Gray stated
forgetting about her was not possible. Id.
126. Ellison did not know what Gray would do. Id. at 874. She thought he might
be crazy. Id Immediately, she telephoned Miller, her supervisor, and told her about
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to transfer either herself or Gray.'2 Gray was transferred to another of-
fice for approximately five months."M Ellison learned of the union
agreement between Gray and the IRS and requested that she receive a
transfer upon Gray's return." In the meantime, Gray sought "joint
counseling" with Ellison and wrote her another letter emphasizing that
he hoped they could maintain some sort of friendship."3
Ellison's supervisor, as well as the IRS employee investigating the
complaint Ellison filed, agreed that Ellison was subjected to sexual ha-
rassment.'' However, the Treasury Department rejected Ellison's com-
plaint." The EEOC affirmed the denial of Ellison's sexual harassment
claim on a different ground."in The district court ruled that Ellison
failed to establish a prima facie case of hostile working environment
sexual harassment."M
C. The Ninth Circuit's Adoption of the Reasonable Woman Standard
Since the Ninth Circuit lacked specific guidelines defining the severity
necessary for actionable conduct, the Ellison court addressed that issue
first.35 The court noted that Gray might resemble a "modem-day
the letter. Id.
127. Id. At this time, Miller also contacted her superior and told him about the
series of events. Id. Miller also had a counseling session with Gray and warned him
to quit bothering Ellison. Ld.
128. Gray went to San Francisco in November of 1986. ldL Three weeks after his
transfer, Gray filed union grievances petitioning for his return to San Mateo. Id.
FInding in his favor, the union would allow him to return in four months if he also
promised to leave Ellison alone. Id.
129. Id. At this -time, Ellison also filed a formal complaint alleging sexual harass-
ment with the IRS. Id.
130. Id, at 874-75. It was never determined if Ellison ever received this final letter.
Id. at 875 n.2. With this letter, Gray attempted to "maintain the idea that he and
Ellison had some sort of relationship." Id, at 875.
131. Ld.
132. Id. The Treasury Department's denial was based on its belief that Ellison's
complaint "did not describe a pattern or practice of sexual harassment covered by
the EEOC regulations." Id.
133. The EEOC felt the IRS had taken appropriate and sufficient action to curb any
reoccurrences of Gray's behavior. Thus, they would not issue Ellison a right to sue
letter. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 876-81. The court also focused on the level of action that employers
must take to shield them from liability under Title VII. Id at 881-83. The court,
applying a holding from another Ninth Circuit case, stated that "employers are liable
for failing to remedy or prevent a hostile or offensive work environment of which
management-level employees knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
known." Id at 881 (following EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515-16 (9th
Cir. 1989)).
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Cyrano de Bergerac" ' vainly attempting to secure the love of one he
so admired. Examined in that light, the court could easily characterize
Gray's conduct as sophomoric, isolated, and trivial.37
But Ellison was on the receiving end of Gray's overtures. In fact,
Ellison found Gray's behavior neither flattering nor trivial; it shocked and
frightened her.lu Following therefrom, the court made its historical de-
termination that a female plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile
environment sexual harassment if the conduct complained of would
unreasonably affect a reasonable woman."
D. The Reasonableness of the Reasonable Woman's Standard
1. Title VII's Purposes Are Advanced
The purposes of Title VII illustrate the need to adopt a reasonable
woman/person of the same sex as the victim standard. This standard of
reasonableness allows behavior to be classified as a violation of Title VII
when the harassers do not even recognize that their behavior is sexually
harassing. "' Examine Gray's actions. He probably did not see his con-
Still, the Hacienda Hotel standard did not address what remedies an employer
must take to avoid liability. The court examined the EEOC Guidelines. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(f) (1991) (stating that employers have a responsibility to express disapprov-
al and establish penalties for sexual harassment). The court also examined what
other circuit courts had done in addressing the same issue. See Katz v. Dole, 709
F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that the remedy must be "reasonably calculated
to end the harassment"); Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828 F.2d 307, 309
(5th Cir. 1987) (stating that remedies should be "assessed proportionately to the
seriousness of the offense"). Thus the EUison court proffered that the court will
determine the adequacy of an employer's remedy by its adequacy in deterring the
harassing individual. EUison, 924 F.2d at 882.
For a more detailed discussion of the responsibility of employers to deter
workplace harassment, see infra notes 231-67 and accompanying text.
136. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 874, 880.
139. Id. at 879-80.
140. Id. at 880; see also H.G. Reza, New Study Indicates Wide Sex Harassment in
Navy, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1992, at Al. A disciplinary proceeding of a Navy pilot
illustrates beautifully men's and women's differing perspectives of reasonable behav-
ior, and also demonstrates the irrelevance of intent
In that case, the pilot thought he would bring humor into a situation involving a
subordinate female officer. Id. The lieutenant commander pulled his zipper down,
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duct as threatening or offensive. Quite probably, some men and women
might view Gray's acts as harmless, maybe even pathetic. But the pur-
pose of Title VII does not concern the harasser's motives."'
Since legislators never intended Title VII to be a fault-based tort
scheme,'" requiring intent to harass as an element of the prima facie
case would be contradictory.' "'Title VII is aimed at the consequences
or effects of an employment practice and not at the... motivation' of
co-workers or employers."'" Therefore, as E/lison advocated, when a
"reasonable victim of the same sex as the plaintiff' would regard the
behavior as sufficiently severe or pervasive, resulting in a hostile working
environment that alters the conditions of employment, the intent of the
harasser is irrelevant.4
Because Title VII is not fault-based, employers face an added responsi-
bility." Furthermore, Title VII requires respondeat superior liability.
Hence, employers need to know that Title VII will hold an employer
liable absent intent to harass.4 Educating the workforce about what
sexual harassment means and what it entails is becoming mandatory."
Employers must instill the different perceptions and life experiences of
men and women into their training sessions. This added responsibility to
educate the workforce will help eradicate behavior the "reasonable vic-
tim would consider unlawful sexual harassment."'
2. Reasonable Woman Standard Does Not Create Unreasonable
Employer iUability
The reasonable woman standard will not result in unreasonable em-
ployer liability. This is because E/lison purposefully used the term "rea-
pulled out his penis, turned around and said to the woman, "So what do you think
of that?" Id. The pilot commented, "When a startled look crossed the woman's face,
I then put my penis back in my pants, sensing that my attempts at a joke to lighten
the situation had failed." Id. (emphasis added).
141. See Reza, supra note 140, at A3. The following account by a woman sailor
epitomizes why Title VII does not require intent to harass. Whenever a woman
looked nice, the supervisor would attempt to pay the woman a compliment. Id. His
.compliment" was, "You look like you just got f[-]ed." Id.
142. EUison, 924 F.2d at 880.
143. Id. (citing Grlggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
144. Id. (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 957 (1972)).
145. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 140-42.
146. See infra notes 218-67 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
148. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880; see also Meritor Says. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 52, 72
(1986) (holding that a grievance policy by itself will not insulate employers from
liability).
149. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880.
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sonable" in the standard. Critics will claim the standard cannot be
met." However, the court explicitly addressed this criticism when stat-
ing that it would consider a reasonable woman's reaction rather than the
particular plaintiffs reaction."' By promoting a standard of reasonable-
ness, the court shielded employers from an onslaught of unfounded
claims. 1
2
Also, this standard does not expose employers to unlimited liability.
Neither Title VII nor Ellison's holding requires employers to accommo-
date the "idiosyncratic concerns of [every] hypersensitive employee.""
The standard of reasonableness protects against this. The court also
recognized that the reasonableness standard is not intended to address
all conduct some men or women find offensive." Thus the standard, as
one of reasonableness, will evolve as the views of the victim change."
As more women become integrated into the workforce and occupy jobs
once predominantly held by men, and vice versa, the more the reason-
able victim of tomorrow will differ from the reasonable victim of today.
As long as the standard remains one of reasonableness, it will reflect the
ever-changing views of society, determined by what those of the same
sex as the victim view as reasonable for the time."
3. Men and Women Have Differing Perspectives and the Reasonable
Victim Standard Addresses Those Differences
A reasonable person standard fails to address the differing perspec-
tives and vulnerabilities men and women retain as members of opposite
genders."' Behavior that many men consider flattering is perceived as
150. See id. at 884 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 179-80.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id at 879 n.12.
155. Id.
156. Id. (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 957 (1972)).
157. Judge Stephens found fault with the reasonable woman standard in his inter-
pretation of Title VII. ld. at 884 (Stephens, J., dissenting). He believed that Title VII
requires a standard applicable to all people; thus, the reasonable woman or man
standard, as individually tailored, is beyond Title V's scope. Id. (Stephens, J., dis-
senting).
In criticizing the majority holding, Judge Stephens stated that he would compro-
mise the rights of the victim. He wrote, "A man's response to circumstances faced by
women and their effect upon women can be and in given circumstances may be
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offensive by many women." EUison recognized that women as a group
are not homogeneous in their outlooks." However, EUison also recog-
nized that women generally share common concerns that men do not.l"
First, women are victims of assault and rape in disproportionately
higher numbers than men.' Also, most victims of sexual harassment in
the workplace are women."s It naturally follows that women will be
expected to be understood by men." Id, (Stephens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
This statement could as easily be applied to women's understanding of men's re-
sponses. Furthermore, Judge Stephens' statement leaves room for situations where
men or women cannot or will not step into the shoes of the other sex. In contrast,
the reasonable person standard, judged from the perspective of the same sex as the
victim, more accurately attempts to understand, and thereby protect the victim from,
sexual harassment.
158. Once again, Judge Stephens found fault with the majority's holding. Id. at 884
(Stephens, J., dissenting). He fails to see the benefits that the new standard provides
because it does take into account that men and women do see things differently. Id.
(Stephens, J., dissenting). Judge Stephens conveniently ignored the majority's reliance
upon statistics indicating that women are more frequently victims of sex crimes than
men. See id. (Stephens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 879 nn.9-1O (discussing the sta-
tistics). For an excellent example of men's and women's differing perspectives, see su-
pra note 137.
159. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
160. Id. One author directly addressed the differences between men and women as
follows:
[Women's] greater physical and social vulnerability to sexual coercion can
make women wary of sexual encounters. Moreover, American women have
been raised in a society where rape and sex-related violence have reached
unprecedented levels .... Finally, women as a group tend to hold more re-
strictive views of both the situation and type of relationship in which sexual
conduct is appropriate. Because of the inequality and coercion with which it
is so frequently associated in the minds of women, the appearance of sexual-
ity in an unexpected context or a setting of ostensible equality can be an an-
guishing experience.
Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms,
42 VAND. L REV. 1183, 1205 (1989).
161. For a current look at statistics regarding reports of sexual harassment in the
workplace, see infra note 226. In 1990, an estimated 80 of every 100,000 females in
the United States reported incidents of rape, an increase of about 896 from 1989.
During 1990, the estimated number of forcible rapes against women was 102,555.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 16 (1990).
162. See Laurie Becklund & Chuck Phillips, Sexual Harassment Claims Confront
Music Industry, LA. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1991, at Al. During the past two years, three
record companies have faced charges of sexual harassment: RCA, Island, and Geffen.
Id. Sexual harassment in the music industry, according to inside sources, has been
described as the rule, rather than the exception. Id. During interviews at the various
companies, women protected each other by identifying "bimbo hounds" who demand-
ed sex as a prerequisite to advancement. Id. at A18. Summing up women's place in
the music industry, Rosemary Carroll an attorney with Codikow, Leventhal and
Carroll, a Beverly Hills law firm, said, "The music business is basically a microcosm
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more sensitive to conduct, sexual in nature, which occurs in the
workplace. To women, any form of sexual conduct, whether harsh or
mild, may instinctively cause concern that the conduct will lead to more
serious types of bodily intrusion." Thus, the reasonable victim stan-
dard effectively addresses the differing socialization and societal con-
cerns of men and women.
Secondly, the court adopted the reasonable victim standard because "a
sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and tends
of society-it is controlled by white men, some of whom carry their power with
dignity and honor, and others of whom use it to manipulate, exploit, and repress
those less powerful." Id.
See also Reza, supra note 140, at Al, A3. Kay Krohne, a retired Navy Command-
er, recently concluded a study of sexual harassment of women Navy officers. Id.
Krohne interviewed 61 women officers. Id, Forty, or 65.596, claimed that they had
encountered sexual harassment. Id.
Some may criticize Krohne's pool as too limited. However, her conclusions
corresponded with a 1990 Defense Department report finding that 64% of women in
the U.S. military suffered sexual harassment. Id. at A3.
163. See Marianne Junger, Women's Experiences of Sexual Harassment, 27 BRrr. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 358 (1987). Junger conducted a study to determine the causes of
women's fear of crime. Id. Two explanations were offered for women's high scores
on fear and anticipation scales of crime: 1) women have experiences of sexual ha-
rassment, whereas men do not, and 2) women score higher on factors that influence
people's ability to handle potentially dangerous situations. Id at 381.
Junger also discussed other causes of women's enhanced fear of sexual harass-
ment, including. beliefs about crime, assessments of risk of victimization, and per-
ceived threat of crime. Id. at 360. "[B]ellefs about crime are opinions and beliefs
about crime which constitute the cognitive aspect of perceptions of victimisation." Id
Assessment of risk, as the first element of fear, intimately relates to personal vulner-
ability, physical dominance, and the gravity of the harm associated with being a
victim. Id. Women also perceive that they face a higher threat of crime due to other
interrelated factors: their physical weakness, the perception that they are more often
victims of crime and the debilitating repercussions of victimization. Id. at 361. Junger
notes that some researchers attribute women's greater fear of crime to the effects of
rape. Thus, fear of rape may justify women's differing perceptions to behavior in the
workplace.
See also Mark Warr, Fear of Victimization: Why Are Women and the Elderly
More Afraid? 65 Soc. ScI. Q. 681 (1984). Warr concludes that women have an in-
creased fear of crime because of their greater sensitivity to risk. Id. at 698. Warr
arrives at this conclusion because women are socialized to recognize signs of danger
from an early age. I& "Girls are almost universally warned about the danger of
sexual molestation. Sometimes the warnings are vague-girls must avoid strange men,
not to be out alone at night.. . ." Id. Warr goes on to hypothesize that rape, as the
"master offense," is a prime source of terror for many women. Id. at 700.
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to systematically ignore"' the disparate experiences of men and wom-
en.U The reasonable victim standard is gender-conscious. As such, it
examines sexually harassing behavior from the perspective of the vic-
tim." A gender-conscious examination allows women to participate "in
the workplace on an equal footing with men." 7
Lastly, by utilizing the reasonable victim standard, EUison recognized
that sexual harassment is a problem of significant import in the
workplace."e This indicates that courts and society have begun to stop
the perpetuation of stereotypes and barriers that historically have pre-
vented women from achieving equal employment opportunities.
EUison did not advocate the reasonable victim standard to alienate and
164. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 160-62; see also Warr, supra note 163, at
695. Wart provides insight as to why women have a greater perceived risk of victim-
ization than men. See id. at 695-98. This also illustrates why the viewpoint of a
reasonable victim of the same sex as the victim is the more correct standard. See id.
As already stated, women fear rape at a proportionately higher rate than do men.
Some argue that typical acts of sexual harassment such as sexual comments, pictures
of naked women, and off-color jokes or "compliments" do not rise to such a level.
They claim women are being overly sensitive.
Nonetheless, Warr explains, such conduct has a more severe effect upon women
in the work place. Id. at 695. These offenses may generate fear because women
associate the conduct with more serious offenses. Id. Wart describes these "other"
offenses, the sexually harassing conduct, as "perceptually contemporaneous offenses:
offenses that are viewed as accompanying or ensuing from any particular offense."
Id. For example, if a woman perceives a likely threat of burglary, this may also
result in extreme fear of assault, rape, or murder-likely contemporaneous offenses.
But as Mr. Wart stresses, since men do not equally fear contemporaneous offenses,
the same perceived risk may produce little fear among men. Id.
Thus, a workplace charged with the perceptually contemporaneous offenses of
sexual innuendo and harassment could have the same effect upon women as a rob-
bery situation. The natural contemporaneous offense arising from such conduct is
rape or sexual assault. Because men do not share the same perceived risks of sex
crimes as women, men and women will have differing views, and the reasonable
person of the same sex as the victim reconciles those differences.
166. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879. It does not, however, "establish a higher level of pro-
tection for women than men." Id.
167. Id.
168. Elison, 924 F.2d at 880; see also Reza, supra note 140, at A3. Sexual harass-
ment has other detrimental affects in the workplace. Id. It lowers women's productiv-
ity because they must spend time warding off unwanted advances. Id.
Also, sexual harassment costs employers millions of dollars. From May 1985 to
May 1987, the federal government expended $267 million for costs of sick time,
employee replacement, and decrease in productivity. UNITED STATES MERIT SYSTEMS
PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE 11
(1988); see also Eliot Brenner, Final Report: U.S. Finds Sexual Harassment Costly,
LA. DAILY J., April 29, 1991, at 7 (overall look at costs of sexual harassment); Sidney
Kess, The Consequences of Sexual Harassment, N.Y.LJ., Oct. 21, 1991, at 3 (analyzing
the tax consequences of sexual harassment).
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further divide the sexes. By adopting the reasonable perspective of the
victim, man or woman, Ellison attempted to fulfill the "hope that over
time both men and women will learn what conduct offends reasonable
members of the other sex."' Only "when employers and employees inter-
nalize the standard of workplace conduct [established by Ellison, will]
the current gap in perception between the sexes [] be bridged.""T
MY. THE REASONABLE WOMAN STANDARD AFrER ELLISON
A. Hostile Work Environment and the Reasonable Woman Standard in
Other Jurisdictions
Close to the time Ellison was decided,'"' the United States District
Court for the middle district of Florida ruled on a hostile work environ-
ment sexual harassment case. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards"
adopted a reasonable woman's standard in conjunction with a subjective
reasonable person standard.'" Robinson is unique because the court
easily determined that a subjective reasonable person would have been
offended by the conduct; yet the court found it' necessary to determine.
whether a reasonable woman would find the working environment abu-
sive.7
4
Plaintiff Robinson worked as a welder at a predominantly male ship-
yard. Robinson based her claim upon the plethora of pictures in the
workplace showing women in varying states of undress. In addition to
those pictures, male supervisors and employees made remarks that de-
graded women as a class." Since the main issue in the case centered
around the element of employer liability,'" the court initially decided
whether the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to affect a
169. EUison, 924 F.2d at 881; see supra notes 140-41, 162, 165 and accompanying
text.
170. EUison, 924 F.2d at 881.
171. EUison was decided on January 23, 1991. Id. at 872.
172. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991). Robinson was decided on January 18th,
but the final judgment was not entered until March 8, 1991. Id.
173. Id. at 1524.
174. Id. The issue on appeal was the objective evaluation-whether a reasonable
person of the same sex as Robinson, a female, would perceive that a hostile environ-
ment existed. Id.
175. Id at 1522.
176. Id. at 1490. The defendants conceded that even if the plaintiff could satisfy the
burden of hostile work environment, the court could not impose respondeat superior
liability. Id.
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term, condition or privilege of employment. Recognizing that it must
examine the totality of the circumstances,'" the court also specified
that it must use both an objective and subjective test to determine if the
harassment was "sufficiently severe or persistent to affect seriously [the
victim's] psychological well being.""
The court upheld the lower court's finding that Robinson had shown
that the conduct affected her at least as much as it would affect a "rea-
sonable person under like circumstances." However, this alone was
insufficient. The court required an examination to ascertain if a reason-
able woman would agree that the pictures and remarks created a hostile
environment." In determining that Robinson satisfied the objective por-
tion, the court stressed that the reasonable woman standard accounts for
salient conditions in the workplace."'
Additionally, the objective portion/reasonable woman standard does
not mandate that all women in the workplace complain of the behav-
ior." If courts required such complaints as a component of the rea-
sonable woman standard, female plaintiffs would have a much harder
time proving that similar conduct affected a reasonable woman. Such a
stringent requirement would essentially nullify the reasonable woman
standard altogether"
In another recent case, Radtke v. Everett,'" the Court of Appeals of
Michigan declined to follow Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., and in-
177. Id. at 1524.
178. To satisfy the subjective portion, the court announced that Robinson would
need to demonstrate that she, at a minimum, was affected in a manner similar to a
reasonable person under similar circumstances. Id. The court declared the objective
standard "asks whether a reasonable person of Robinson's sex, that is, a reasonable
woman, would perceive that an abusive working environment has been created." Id.
179. Id, The shipyard conceded this point, relying on its assertion that Robinson
was hypersensitive and thus could not satisfy the objective portion. Id.
180. Id, Applying the familiar totality of the circumstances inquiry, the court
stressed that it is also appropriate to consider the interaction between the severity
and pervasiveness of the conduct Id. As one increases, the other may decrease
proportionately. Id. Thus a plaintiff may satisfy the legal definition of a hostile work
environment even though single incidents would not necessarily rise to an actionable
level. Id. (citing Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1484 (3d Cir. 1990)).
181. An example of a salient condition is "the rarity of women in the relevant work
areas." Id.
182. Id, at 1525 (citing Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571, 582 (N.D. Cal. 1986)).
183. See supra note 163.
184. 471 N.W.2d 660 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), review granted, 487 N.W.2d 762 (Mich.
1992). This case was decided on May 20, 1991 and released for publication on July
29, 1991. Id.
185. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1982); see supra
notes 49-64 and accompanying text.
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stead adopted Ellison's reasonable woman standard." The plaintiff
based her hostile work environment cause of action upon the Michigan
Civil Rights Act, which is modeled after Title VIL 7 On appeal, the court
held that a single incident of offensive conduct could create a hostile
work environment and remanded the case to the lower court." In de-
clining to follow Rabidue, the court became more plaintiff oriented."
The plaintiff in Radtke worked for Clarke-Everett Dog and Cat Hospital
for four and a half years before the harassing act occurred.' One hec-
tic Sunday, when Radtke was working alone with Everett, Everett ap-
proached Radtke on the couch and put his arm around her shoulders. 9'
Radtke tried to get up and Everett would not allow her to move. Finally,
Radtke freed herself and indicated her displeasure to Everett. Nonethe-
less, Everett still proceeded to fondle Radtke and also attempted to kiss
her." Radtke immediately left the building and terminated her employ-
ment the next day." The court explicitly declined to follow state case
law' and Rabidue,"' by holding that one act of sexual harassment
can be sufficient to maintain a claim of hostile work environment."'
The court; adopted Ellison's reasonable woman standard over Rabidue's
reasonable person standard. The court also stressed that regardless of
gender, it would consider the reasonable victim of the same sex as the
plaintiff standard."7
186. Radtke, 471 N.W.2d at 664.
187. Id. at 663; see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2103(h)(iii) (West 1985).
188. Radtke, 471 N.W.2d at 665-66.
189. The court explicitly stated that the "principles in Rabidue prevent the state
Civil Rights Act from achieving its purpose of eliminating sexual harassment from the
workplace and ensuring employees the right to work in an environment free from
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult." Id. at 664.
190. Id at 661.
191. Id.
192. Ld. Everett's actions involved massaging Radtke's back while attempting to
fondle her breasts. Id,
193. Id. Radtke did notify her other employer, Dr. Clarke, about Everett's conduct.
Id. at 661..62. Clarke did nothing to remedy the situation. Id. He also told Radtke
women such as herself should know they would encounter such behavior because of
their vivacious personalities. Id.
194. See Langlois v. McDonald's Restaurants of Mich., Inc., 385 N.W.2d 778, 780
(1986) (declaring that a single act of harassment cannot create a hostile work en-
vironment).
195. Rabidue, 805 F.2d 611.
196. Radtke, 471 N.W.2d at 665. The court went on to say that in some instances
the mere presence of the harasser could create a hostile environment. Id.
197. Id. at 664 n.8.
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The court emphasized that Rabidue did not advance the Elliot-Larsen
Act's purposes.'" Also, while examining the conduct under the totality
of the circumstances, the court posited that the reasonable woman stan-
dard would allow for the severity of the conduct to vary inversely with
the pervasiveness.' Furthermore, Radtke's reasoning followed Ellison.
The court stressed that the reasonable woman standard will help curb
the "trivializing... effects of sexual harassment that ha[ve] previously
occurred under the gender-neutral 'reasonable person' standard."'
Thus, examining the offensive behavior under the totality of the circum-
stances,"' the court could not conclude that Radtke overreacted to the
incident. The court determined that the lower court improperly dismissed
Radtke's complaint; it thus reversed and remanded the case for proceed-
ings consistent with the opinion.'
B. The Reasonable Woman in Other Contexts
Courts have not limited the reasonable woman standard to instances
of hostile work environment sexual harassment. Since Ellison, other
courts have referred to the reasonable woman standard in a variety of
contexts.' Harris v. International Paper' exemplifies the standard's
applicability in other scenarios.
Harris involved a claim of racial harassment.' Because the First Cir-
198. Id at 664.
199. Id at 665.
200. Id, at 664 (citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 579-80 (9th Cir. 1991)).
201. Id. at 665.
202. Id, In its totality of the circumstances determination, the court heavily weighed
Radtke's schedule requiring her to work with Everett the next day, and Clarke's
failure to take any remedial action. Id. The court also found that Radtke had been
constructively discharged. Id.
203. See, e.g., Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 165 (5th Cir. 1991) (recogniz-
ing standard's importance in thwarting claims by hypersensitive plaintiffs in an action
involving an alleged violation of the establishment clause); Austen v. Hawaii, 759 F.
Supp. 612, 628 (D. Haw. 1991) (applying the standard in determining whether a
supervisor retaliated against a female faculty member in a discriminatory way for ad-
vancing women's issues on campus); Carrillo v. Ward, 770 F. Supp. 815, 822 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (noting standard is appropriate to apply in a section 1983 cause of action); cf.
Hansel v. Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 778 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Colo. 1991) (utilizing
Ellison's treatment regarding appropriate remedial action to be taken by employers).
Contra Trotta v. Mobil Oil Corp., 788 F. Supp. 1336, 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying a
reasonable person, rather than a reasonable victim, standard to determine if a hostile
work environment had been created).
204. 765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Me. 1991).
205. Hars and Pugh, another plaintiff, were paper mill employees who suffered
other employees' racial slurs and hatred. Id. at 1517, 1519-20. Harris and Pugh were
called "lazy n[-]," "black son-of-a-bitch," and "Buckwheat," among many other rac-
ist epithets. Id. Harris endured a Ku Klux Klan-like incident. Id, at 1518. In addition,
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cult was split on the applicable standard in racial harassment cases,'
the Harris court took the opportunity to adopt a standard it felt was
appropriate. Analogizing the effects and incidents of racial harassment in
the workplace to occasions of sexual harassment, the court felt com-
pelled to adopt the "reasonable black person standard" in cases of hos-
tile environment racial harassment.' Likewise, if the victim were of
Asian or Hispanic descent, the Court would apply the standard of a rea-
sonable person of that protected group.'
Harris' policy for the adoption of the standard mirrored the policy
advocated by Ellison." The reasonable woman standard is necessitated
by women's extraordinary concerns evolving from their socialization and
history in society."' Likewise, the Harris court emphasized that black
Americans, like women, had experienced special social experiences. "'
Thus, the reasonable black person standard would address those differ-
ences, while not exposing employers to unreasonable liability because
the standard still requires reasonableness.
Similarly, the reasonable black person standard helps to place black
Americans on a more equal footing in the workplace with white Ameri-
cans." Also, like the Ellison court, the Harris court recognized that all
black Americans will not view conduct in the same way. Thus, the rea-
sonable black person standard does not require all members of the class
to find the conduct offensive. This protects the employer from overly
sensitive plaintiffs."" The Harris court also stressed how the standard
would advance the purposes of Title VI.214 Like Radtke,"' Harris did
there was racist graffiti on the mill walls. Id,
206. Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988) applied a standard in-
volving two different perspectives: the harasser's and the victim's. Id. at 898. Lipsett
followed Judge Keith's dissent and advocated that the court should consider men's
and women's points of view individually. Id. Morgan v. Massachusetts General Hospi-
206.12tal, 901 F.2d 186 (ist Cir. 1990), applied the reasonable person test to deter-
mine if the conduct was unwelcome and pervasive. Id. at 192-93. Chamberlin v. 101
Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777 (Ist Cir. 1990) applied yet another standard. Id. at 784.
Chamberlin used the perspective of the employee. Id.
207. Harris, 765 F.2d at 1516.
208. d at 1516 n.12.
209. Id. at 1515-16.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 157-58, 160, 162.
211. See supra note 205.
212. Harris, 765 F. Supp. at 1516 n.11.
213. See supra note 207.
214. Harris, 765 F. Supp. at 1516. Noting that Title VII redresses the effects of ra-
cial discrimination, the court declared that in order to comprehend those effects, the
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not follow any standards previously enunciated by the First Circuit,216
and adopted the more plaintiff-oriented standard advocated by the Ninth
Circuit in Ellison."7
V. AVOIDING LIABILITY: AN EMPLOYER'S STRATEGY
A. Consequences of Respondeat Superior Liability
A required element for a successful Title VII cause of action based
upon hostile work environment is establishing respondeat superior liabili-
ty.2 . However, no concrete standard defines employer liability in hostile
work environment cases."' Though Vinson did not adopt strict liabili-
ty,u0 courts should apply general agency principles in determining em-
ployer liability." Under this theory, once a court finds an agency rela-
tionship, the court can hold the employer liable for an employee's harass-
ing behavior.
Title VII does not promote a fault-based tort scheme; rather, it address-
es the effects of adverse employment practices and not the motivation of
co-workers or employers.' Because Title VII does not look at fault or
intent,'m employers need to implement reporting procedures as well as
provide educational programs communicating to their employees that the
employer will not tolerate harassment. Furthermore, since the Thomas-
Hill hearings' and the Tailhook scandal,' public awareness of sexual
fact finder must "walk a mile in the victim's shoes." Id.; see also supra notes 140-50
and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 184-202 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 206 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 136-49 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
219. The Supreme Court failed to adopt a bright-line standard regarding employer
liability. See Meritor Says. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). The Court stated,
however, that it will not hold employers automatically liable for sexual harassment by
supervisors and implied that it will determine employers' responsibility by agency
principles. Id.; e.g., Katherine S. Anderson, Employer Liability Under Title VII for
Sexual Harassment After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87 COLUM. L REV. 1258
(1987) (discussing principles determining employer liability and advocating a vicarious
liability standard for quid pro quo harassment and harassment by supervisors and a
traditional knowledge standard for harassment by co-employees).
220. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
221. The Court narrowly defeated strict liability. Id. Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun and Stevens joined in the concurring opinion calling for strict liability on
the part of employers. Id.
222. Ellison v. Brady, 942 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454
F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 957 (1972)); see also Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (advocating that the absence of discrimina-
tory intent does not redeem an otherwise unlawful employment practice).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 142-45.
224. For a discussion of the Thomas-Hill hearings, see Gloria Borger et al., The Un-
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harassment is high.' This public awareness, coupled with the more
plaintiff-friendly reasonable woman standard, necessitates that employers
implement plans that address sexual harassment in the workplace.
The EEOC Guidelines provide a useful starting point with respect to
prevention.' Utilizing the EEOC Guidelines, careful employers should
adopt protective measures to insulate themselves from liability. Proper
corrective action by employers will help avert liability for acts of super-
visors,m  co-employees m  and non-employees. ° Thus, an employer
can minimize exposure to liability by making it clear that the employer
will not tolerate sexual harassment and by taking effective measures to
told Story, UJ.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 12, 1992, at 28.
225. See generally Eloise Salholz, Deepening Shame, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 10, 1992, at
30; Eloise Salholz and Douglas Waller, Tailhook: Scandal Time, NEWSWEEK, July 6,
1992, at 40.
226. Since the Hill-Thomas hearings, complaints of sexual harassment have risen
4596. Claudia MacLachlan, Harassment Charges Up One Year After Hill, NAT'L L.J.,
Oct 26, 1992, at 7. The EEOC was inundated with 9953 complaints in the year end-
ing Oct. 1, an increase from 7407 in the previous year. Id. In the period between
Oct 1, 1991 and March 31, 1991, the EEOC received 2542 complaints, exactly 1000
more than the same six-month period the previous year. Randall Samson, Bias Law
Booms Huge Verdicts, New Laws Rock the Employment Litigation Base, NAT'L LJ.,
July 27, 1992, at 1.
227. The Guidelines provides:
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An em-
ployer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from
occurring, such as affrmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disap-
proval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their right to
raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under Title VII, and develop-
ing methods to sensitize all concerned.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1991).
228. Ld. § 1604.11(c). The Guidelines recommend strict liability for acts involving
supervisors. Id. Under the Guidelines, an employer faces liability for any supervisory
harassment regardless of policies forbidding such conduct, and regardless of whether
the employer did know or should have known of the conduct. Id.
229. Id. § 1604.11(d). The EEOC does not recommend strict liability for
non-supervisory employees. See id. Employer liability for harassing acts by co-workers
results only when the plaintiff can show the employer knew or should have known
of the alleged conduct and failed to take prompt and appropriate action. Id.
230. Id. § 1604.11(e). The employer may be held liable for sexual harassment by
non-employees when the employer, as supervisor or other agent, knew or should
have known of the conduct and failed to take immediate action. Id. The EEOC
stresses consideration of the employers' control over the non-employee and other
responsibility "the employer may have with respect to the conduct of such
non-employee." Id.
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remedy the situation. The following guidelines will help insulate employ-
ers from liability, as well as assist in the prevention of sexual harassment
in the workplace.
B. An Employer's Guide to Preventing Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace
1. Prepare and Circulate A Policy Condemning Sexual Harassment in
the Workplace
The EEOC Guidelines contain pertinent, yet general, advice." Ac-
cordingly, employers should formulate a thorough policy that specifically
condemns sexual harassment. While the form need not be complex, the
content should specifically address sexual harassment.' Furthermore,
the employer must adequately circulate the policy.' For instance, the
employer may post the policy in an area frequented by all employees,
such as on a kitchen or break room refrigerator.' Employers could al-
so publish the policy in employee manuals, handbooks, and newslet-
ters. 6
In addition to circulating the written policy, employers should conduct
sexual harassment training seminars for supervisors and support staff.'
Employee meetings or company retreats may serve as appropriate
forums. 7 Employers can also effectively utilize union meetings and oth-
231. See id.
232. Meritor Says. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). The court indicated that
defendant's nondiscriminatory guidelines were inadequate because they "did not ad-
dress sexual harassment in particular." Id. at 72-73; see also David S. Machlowitz &
Marilyn M. Machlowitz, Preventing Sexual Harassment, ABA JOURNAL, Oct. 1, 1987, at
78-80.
233. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72-73 (stating that because the employer failed to
address sexual harassment with sufficient emphasis, the employer did not "alert" its
employees to its "interest in correcting that form of discrimination").
234. A statement alerting employees that courts have consistently declared Title VII
as prohibiting racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual harassment should suffice as ade-
quate notice. Marvin F. Hill, Jr. & Curtiss K Behrens, Love in the Office: A Guide
for Dealing with Sexual Harassment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
30 DEPAUL L REV. 581, 618 (1981).
235. See generally Lisa A. Blanchard, Note, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace:
Employer Liability for a Sexually Hostile Environment, 66 WASH. U. LQ. 91, 108
(1988).
236. Id. See also Machlowitz & Machlowitz, supra note 230, at 80 (stressing that all
employees, whether those in orientation or those attending a senior management
retreat, should be made familiar with the company's stance on sexual harassment).
237. At staff meetings, the employer should inform the supervisory personnel that
refraining from and preventing sexual harassment reduces the employer's risk of
liability. Jay W. Waks & Michael G. Starr, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace:
Scope of Employer Liability, 7 EMPLOYEE REL L.J. 369, 384-85 (1981).
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er unconventional avenues.m
2. Institute an Accessible Grievance Procedure
Along with educating the work force, the employer must institute a
procedure allowing victimized employees to file complaints. Preferably,
the procedure would allow someone other than an employee's direct
supervisor to act as the employer liaison.m Ideally, a variety of individ-
uals could receive complaints: an ombudsman, a member of the person-
nel office,' a female employee," or any other neutral individual "not
directly related to the complaining party's day-to-day employment."'
3. Investigate Complaints Promptly and Vigorously
When an employee lodges a complaint, the employer must conduct a
thorough investigation. An apathetic response does not communicate a
company's sincerity in eradicating sexual harassment.' The quicker the
action, the greater the deterrence.' A three-step investigative approach
is widely used and easy to follow. 5
238. For a broad discussion on ways employers can avoid liability, including a
discussion of union involvement, see Paula A. Barran, Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace. Eliminating the Offensive Working Environment, 7 LE.R.C. MONOGRAPH
SERIES 69 (University of Or. 1988); William L Kandel, Sexual Harassment: Persistent,
Prevalent, but Preventable, 14 EMPLOYEE REL LJ. 439 (1988).
239. See Meritor Says. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72-73 (1986) (noting that policy
requiring employee to report harassing behavior to direct supervisor is ineffective
since the supervisor is quite often the harasser); Kandel, supra note 237, at 445.
240. Jane L Dolkart & E. Lynn Malchow, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace:
Expanding Remedies, Fall 1987 ToRT INS. LJ. 181, 192-93.
241. Blanchard, supra note 234, at 108. Having a female employee receive com-
plaints would cater to the female employee, the most frequent victim of sexual
harassment. Id,
242. Kandel, supra note 237, at 445-46. A neutral individual will not be as intimidat-
ing to the victim. ld. Also, the victim will fear repercussion less if the individual to
whom the victim complains wields no such power. Id.
243. Machlowitz & Machlowitz, supra note 231, at 80.
244. 1&
245. Most lawyers specializing in the area of employment law advocate a similar
method for an employer to use in investigating claims of sexual harassment. E.g.,
Dolkart & Malchow, supra note 239, at 192-93; Fred W. Suggs, Jr., Advising Your
Corporate Client on Avoiding Charges of Sexual Harassment, 46 AL A LAw. 176
(1985); Machlowitz & Machlowitz, supra note 231, at 80.
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a. Interview the complainant
The furst step should be to interview the complaining employee and
record the allegations in a signed writing.' The writing might include
details of the alleged conduct, dates the conduct occurred, and the
names of any witnesses who could corroborate the story. The EEOC
neither advocates nor prohibits this signing requirement."l Neverthe-
less, it is useful because it narrows and delineates the investigation be-
fore any in-person investigations occur. The signing also 'protects the
[company] in the event of a defamation suit by the accused, and estab-
lishes ... the seriousness of the procedure itself."'
Once the interviewing process begins, the employer should handle it
delicately. An employer who shows concern to the harassed employee
may find they can resolve the internal problems without intervention by
third parties like the EEOC or California's Fair Employment and Housing
Commission." Also, because some employees may feel embarrassed to
recount the events verbally, it may prove useful to have them write down
a narrative describing the incident or have a member of the same sex
interview the victimized employees.'m
b. Interview witnesses
The next step of the process should include interviews with employees
who' may or may not have witnessed the alleged behavior. One problem
of sexual harassment concerns the unavailability of witnesses." Inter-
viewing other employees enables the employer to gauge the credibility of
the complainant and the complainee. This is important because claims
for sexual harassment are ripe for abuse.' For example, a jilted lover
246. Kandel, supra note 237, at 446. See generally Andrea B. Wapner, Sexual Ha-
rassment in the Law Firm, 16 LAw. PRACTICE MGMT. Sept. 16, 1990 at 42, 44 (for-
warding an overall preventive plan employers should follow to avoid liability).
247. Kandel, supra note 237, at 446.
248. Id. An argument against a signing requirment is that it may hinder early re-
porting. Id. The requirement to sign or give an oath would have a "chilling effect"
upon employees who already feel intimidated and afraid to come forward. Id.
249. Sheila J. Kuehl & Abby J. Leibman, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, LA.
LAWYER, December 1990, at 25, 28, 43-4 (setting forth the similarities and differences
between state and federal remedies for sexual harassment).
250. Blanchard, supra note 234, at 108.
251. Investigations will prove difficult because sexual harassment is not likely to
occur in a group setting, but tends to take place in a closed office or deserted store
room. Suggs, supra note 244, at 180.
252. See generally id at 181 (providing a brief discussion regarding ripeness for
abuse in the sexual harassment context and how allowing flirtations to continue is an
invitation for lawsuits); Machlowitz & Machlowitz, supra note 231, at 78-79 (noting
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might file a complaint as a means of revenge.2M Potential witnesses and
other members of the work force also can provide useful insight when
determining the pervasiveness of the alleged harassment.'
c. Interview the alleged harasser
Finally, the employer should interview the alleged harasser. The rights
of these individuals must not be overlooked. The employer should never
mete out discipline before giving the accused an opportunity to be
heard. ' If the accused harasser belongs to a union, a representative of
the union should be present.'
3. Confidentiality in the Investigation Process
Confidentiality represents a concern for all parties involved: the ha-
rassed, the witnesses, other employees, and the accused. The employer
must keel) confidential files of the investigation. The investigation should
proceed discreetly." Furthermore, the employer should clearly prohibit
retaliation for participating in the company's grievance process.To allevi-
ate any misgivings employees or witnesses may have regarding their
anonymity in the reporting process, employers should assure them that
"the interview is being conducted in order to comply with the employer's
responsibility under Title VII and related [state] statutes and that the
that because "employers are so squeamish about [bad] publicity . . . an unscrupulous
plaintiff can [prey upon this weakness], achieve a quick settlement and destroy anoth-
er employee's career").
253. E.g., Keppler v. Hinsdale Township High Sch., Dist. 86, 715 F. Supp. 862 (N.D.
Ill. 1989) (illustrating an unfounded sexual harassment claim brought on account of a
failed interpersonal relationship). To alleviate the possibility of a Keppler suit, the law
firm of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker considered adopting a no-dating policy that
would prohibit attorney's from diting one another or other employees. Deborah
Squiers, Finn's Pact Sheds Light on Harassment Policies, 204 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1990). The
firm declined to adopt the policy, finding it too difficult to enforce and overly intru-
sive of people's personal affairs. ld.
254. Suggs, supra note 244, at 180. Usually it is difficult to find witnesses to cor-
roborate the alleged incidents. Id. When they are available and willing to come for-
ward, their testimony is invaluable. Id.
255. Id.
256. Machlowitz & Machlowitz, supm note 231, at 80.
257. The likelihood of expensive litigation, bad publicity and lowered morale and
productivity due to distractions caused by sexual harassment claims constitute rea-
sons to advise companies to take a hard stance against sexual harassment. Suggs,
supra note 244, at 181.
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employer will, if at all possible, keep the employee's identity confiden-
tial."' Problems regarding confidentiality usually surface when an em-
ployer defends a suit brought ,by the terminated employee.'
4. Determine the Complaint's Validity
At the completion of the investigation process, the employer must
determine the complaint's validity. Employers must carefully avoid pre-
mature conclusions. Usually the employer will have to make a veracity
determination because cases will be replete with conflicting testimony.
When this occurs, employers should follow the procedures normally em-
ployed in a typical disciplinary proceeding.'
If the employer believes the complaint is valid, the employer must then
choose the appropriate sanction, as discussed below. If the complaint is
not valid or otherwise inconclusive, some action may be appropriate de-
pending on the type of personnel dispute involved. Where the investiga-
tion proves inconclusive on all grounds, the employer should notify sep-
arately the complainant and the accused that the employer conducted an
investigation and did not reach any determinative holdings." Addition-
ally, the employers should reiterate the policy against sexual harassment
to any employees involved in the proceeding. Employers should also
communicate to the accused that the employer will not use the incident
against them.' In appropriate circumstances, it may serve as future
evidence if a later complaint is lodged.
5. Take Appropriate Remedial Action
Discharging the harasser might not be appropriate in all situations. The
employer should "temper" the sanction in all but the most egregious of
258. Barran, supra note 237, at 73; see also Kandel, supra note 237, at 446.
269. When employees are terminated for sexual harassment, the basis of the termi-
nation often becomes the subject of an unemployment compensation hearing, wrong-
ful discharge lawsuit, or defamation actions. Id.; see also Miller v. Servicemaster by
Rees, 1992 WL 282059 (Ariz. Ct. App.) (holding that 'absent malice in fact or improp-
er interference, workers can report alleged workplace sexual harassment without fear
of liability" based on defamation or interference with a business relationship). See
generally Richard A. DuRose, Sexual harassment Turned on its Head: Dealing with
Claims by the Accused Aggressor, 32 FOR THE DEFENSE 2 (1990).
260. Sources of proof that an employer will use to determine a complaint's validity
include credibility determinations based upon demeanor and past reputation, similarity
in stories, and witnesses or other employees' observations. Kandel, supra note 237, at
449.
261. Barran, supra note 237, at 74.
262. Kandel, supra note 237, at 450.
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cases.' Therefore, employers might have to use creativity to alleviate a
hostile environment when correlating the sanction to the crime.
If an employee handbook or manual sets forth a disciplinary process
to follow when addressing sexual harassment claims, the employer
should heed the written direction. If the employer deviates from the
proposed guidelines, the employer might invite breach of contract law-
suits. "
The employer may rectify less serious offenses with verbal or written
reprimands or placement of the accused on probationary-type status.
More serious conduct may require demotion or suspension. Certain of-
fenders may deserve the most serious sanction of all, termination. In
other circumstances, employers should not hesitate to institute creative
solutions. The employer may simply transfer the offending employee. The
offender may seek mandatory counseling as a practical solution. The
employer may require the offender to attend training seminars, or even
to organize such seminars for the company. In the appropriate cases, the
guilty party also may contribute to the victim's monetary losses.'
6. Conduct an Exit Interview with the Complainant
Once they have exhausted the entire procedure, including sanctions,
employers, should confer with the complainant regarding the outcome of
the process. The explanation need not be in full detail; informing the
complainant that the employer investigated and remedied the situation
will suffice. 8 Additionally, as part of this meeting, the employer should
assure the employee that retaliation will not be tolerated. ' Thus, if the
employee encounters any adverse reactions from the disciplined employ-
ee or other co-workers, the employer should encourage the complainant
to report the behavior to the proper individual.
VI. CONCLUSION
The women from Stroh Brewery have a long road ahead of them in
pursuit of their Title VII claim of hostile work environment sexual ha-
263. Wapner, supra note 245, at 44.
264. Kandel, supra note 237, at 442; see also Suggs, supra note 244, at 180 (provid-
ing viable alternatives an employer can utilize when termination is not appropriate).
265. Wapner, supra note 245, at 44.
266. Kandel, supra note 237, at 450.
267. 1&
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rassment. As of this writing, it has not been decided whether their griev-
ances are reasonable. That is for the trier of fact to decide. One thing is
certain: the adoption of the reasonable woman standard did not evolve
overnight. The standard's very existence demonstrates that courts finally
will recognize that women should participate on an equal footing with
men in the workplace.
Does the reasonable woman/reasonable victim of the same sex as the
plaintiff standard really change anything? Under the new standard, Title
VII plaintiffs, like the women from Stroh Brewery, still will have to dem-
onstrate that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
their conditions of employment. That much has not changed.
The new standard, though, unlike the reasonable person standard,
unequivocally communicates that the particular victim is the main focus,
whether male or female. This is the major change and precisely the point
of the victim-/gender-conscious standard. Society must look at sexual
harassment from the victim's eyes, not from the perpetrator's or
society's. Therefore, neither men nor women will receive special treat-'
ment: they will receive equal treatment, in accordance with standards of
reasonableness as defined by a woman as victim or a man as.victim, re-
spectively. Hopefully, application of this new standard, combined with
employers' and society's greater awareness of sexual harassment, will
help to finally eradicate sexual harassment of both women and men in
the workplace.
PENNY L. CIGOY
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